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Self-perception is disrupted in people with borderline personality disorder (BPD) and deper-
sonalization disorder (DPD), ﬂuctuating with sudden shifts in affect in BPD and experienced
as detached in DPD. Measures of implicit self-esteem (ISE), free from conscious control
and presentation biases, may highlight how such disruptions of self-concept differentially
affect these two populations on an unconscious level.We examined ISE using the Implicit
Association Test, along with measures of emotion, behavior, and temperament, in BPD
(n = 18), DPD (n = 18), and healthy control (n = 35) participants. DPD participants had sig-
niﬁcantly higher ISE andweremore harm avoidant than BPD and control participants, while
BPD participants had more “frontal” behaviors and impulsivity and less self-directedness
and cooperativeness than DPD and control participants. Thus, while BPD and DPD com-
monly overlap in terms of dissociative symptoms and emotional irregularities, differences
in self-esteem, behavior, and temperament can help identify where they diverge in terms
of their cognition, behavior, and ultimately underlying neurobiology.
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INTRODUCTION
Sense of self is disrupted for individuals with borderline personal-
ity disorder (BPD) and with depersonalization disorder (DPD). In
BPD, this global feeling of self-identity and worth is one of several
unstable attributes, which include unstable “interpersonal rela-
tionships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity”(Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 706). Their self-image – as
well as affect, cognition, and behavior – ﬂuctuates with their
perception of rejection or abandonment (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). These abandonment fears arise from unstable
interpersonal relationships where they initially idealize another
person, then criticize, and devalue them. This reﬂects a defensive
mechanism called “splitting”where representations of the self and
others are perceived as all good or all bad, and instead of suc-
cessfully integrating these representations, they oscillate between
the two with shifts in their affect (Lynum et al., 2008; Myers and
Zeigler-Hill, 2008). DPD, in contrast, is characterized by “a per-
sistent or recurrent feeling of being detached from one’s mental
processes or body that is accompanied by intact reality testing,”
in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p.
519). Individuals with DPD may feel like they are automatons,
as if they are living in a movie or dream, or may feel outside of
their thoughts or body, but they are aware that it is just a feeling
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Given that aspects of
self-representation, such as self-worth and self-concept, are dis-
rupted in each of these disorders, we investigated how implicit
self-esteem (ISE) is affected in these populations.
Depersonalization is thought to be the result of a psychologi-
cal defense mechanism where negative thoughts about oneself or
events of one’s life are split off, such that they are experienced as
disconnected and therefore not traumatic (Guralnik et al., 2000).
Speciﬁc cognitive deﬁcits in DPD patients, including difﬁculties
on measures of attention, short-term memory, and spatial rea-
soning, may also underlie subjective experiences of perceptual
disturbances (Guralnik et al., 2000). Evidence suggests that people
with DPD are in a heightened state of alert, yet their response
to emotional stimuli is attenuated (Phillips et al., 2001; Sierra
et al., 2002). Sierra and Berrios (1998) posit a corticolimbic dis-
connection model of DPD whereby hyperactivity of the right
prefrontal cortex [particularly the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC)] increases alertness, while left prefrontal activa-
tion inhibits the amygdala and other limbic structures, causing
hypoemotionality. Findings from a PET study by Simeon et al.
(2000) suggest that a disconnection may occur earlier in the emo-
tional processing stream; they found functional differences only
in sensory associative cortical regions, with no metabolic differ-
ences in prefrontal or anterior cingulate regions. However, later
functional neuroimaging studies of DPD lend some support to
the theory that dampened subjective experience of emotion is
due to increased activation of frontal regions with concomitant
decreased activation in areas of emotional perception such as ante-
rior cingulate, insula, and amygdala (Phillips et al., 2001; Medford
et al., 2006). While the neurobiological underpinnings are still not
understood, speciﬁc perceptual, cognitive, and affective deﬁcits in
DPD are well known.
Patients with BPD have also been found to have cognitive
deﬁcits in a wide range of domains, but with signiﬁcant impair-
ment in executive functions like planning, cognitive ﬂexibility, and
response inhibition,which suggests a deﬁcit in orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) (Berlin and Rolls, 2004; Berlin et al., 2005). Furthermore,
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neuroimaging studies have found structural and functional abnor-
malities of theOFC inBPD (e.g., Soloff et al., 2000;Tebartz vanElst
et al., 2003). Given its role in inhibition, dysfunction of the OFC
in BPD patients may underlie their failure to inhibit perceived
negative emotional information or erroneous interpretations,
potentially contributing to dysregulated self-esteem.
Borderline personality disorder and DPD are classiﬁed as dis-
tinct disorders by the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 2000), however they commonly overlap in their symp-
tomology. In particular, there is a high incidence of dissociative
symptoms in BPD, as well as high comorbidity of BPD and dis-
sociative disorders, especially DPD (Sar et al., 2006; Zanarini and
Jager-Hyman, 2009). Studies of unconscious personality organi-
zation, such as ISE – which arises from automatic associations
with the self and unconscious processing of affective experiences,
as opposed to the deliberate, conscious self-evaluation of explicit
self-esteem – may highlight differences in self-perception in these
two disorders.
Despite problems with sense of self in these disorders, there
is a paucity of research examining self-esteem in people with
BPD and DPD. Self-esteem refers to overall feelings of self-worth
(Buhrmester et al., 2011), and is not generally considered to be
relative, or based on, valuation of things or other people. To
our knowledge, no studies have been conducted on self-esteem
in DPD to date. A study by Michal et al. (2006) found that patients
with DPD report feeling extremely helpless, fragile, worthless, and
socially isolated, which may contribute to, or emanate from lower
self-esteem, but this was assessed with an inventory of narcissism
rather than a measure of self-esteem. Others have described “an
exaggerated and often unpleasant hyperawareness of the self” in
DPD (Dell, 2009, p. 779), yet it remains unknown how this affects
self-esteem.
More research has been done on self-esteem in BPD, demon-
strating that like mood and evaluations of others, self-esteem may
ﬂuctuate between extreme highs and lows. Several studies have
found a correlation between BPD features (BPDF) and labile, low
self-esteem (Watson, 1998; Tolpin et al., 2004; Zeigler-Hill and
Abraham, 2006). Further, Lynum et al. (2008) found that partici-
pants with BPD had higher explicit self-esteem as reported on the
Self-Esteem Index than those with avoidant personality disorder
(APD), although both groups scored in the clinical range of low
self-esteem. They hypothesize that higher self-esteem in BPD is
similarly due to ﬂuctuations in mood and identity in this popu-
lation, which contrast consistently low self-esteem in APD. While
these studies provide evidence for an association between low,
ﬂuctuating self-esteem, and borderline personality characteristics,
they all used subjective self-reportmeasures of explicit self-esteem.
Because explicit self-esteem is subject to conscious reﬂection,
these results could be inﬂuenced by participants’ presentation
biases and limited capability of introspection and thus affected
by BPD patients’ volatile emotions. Instead, implicit measures can
be employed in order to avoid capturing self-presentation.
Research supports the idea that people have an implicit as
well as explicit attitude toward themselves (Greenwald and Banaji,
1995). Explicit self-esteem arises from reﬂective, conscious evalua-
tion of self-relevant information, while ISE is automatic, intuitive,
and unconscious (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Schröder-Abé
et al., 2007). Thus explicit self-esteem can be assessed with
direct measures such as questionnaires, but ISE requires indirect
measures that assess one’s reaction to self-relevant stimuli. While
people are able to explicitly report on their self-concept with some
accuracy, research shows that this is subject to inﬂuence by demand
characteristics such as social desirability, and may not even be fully
available to us given limitations in introspection (Greenwald and
Banaji, 1995). Furthermore, these two constructs are considered
independent; implicit and explicit self-esteem are weakly corre-
lated, and can even be at odds with one another (Greenwald and
Farnham, 2000; Vater et al., 2010). Typical, healthy adults tend to
demonstrate congruent self-esteem, with a positive bias on both
implicit and explicit self-esteem (Valiente et al., 2011). Discrepan-
cies between the two (high explicit/low implicit, high implicit/low
explicit) are relatively common, however, and indicate inner emo-
tional turmoil or maladjustment (Schröder-Abé et al., 2007). In
BPD, Vater et al. (2010) found that having either kind of self-
esteem discrepancy is positively correlated with BPD symptom
severity.
In sum,self-concept appears tobedisrupted inpeoplewithBPD
and DPD, but in different ways, ﬂuctuating with sudden shifts in
affect in BPD and experienced as detached in DPD. Measures of
self-esteem may highlight how such disruptions of the concept
of self differentially affect these two populations. Implicit mea-
sures in particular may better capture underlying differences in
self-esteem that are free from conscious control and presentation
biases that can inﬂuence explicit measures. Thus, we examined
self-esteem in DPD and BPD in this study using Greenwald and
Farnham (2000) adapted Implicit Association Test (IAT), which
captures self-esteem based on one’s ability to evaluate good and
bad concepts as self-associated or other-associated. We hypothe-
sized that the two patient groups would respond differently from
one another,and that peoplewithDPDandBPDwould show lower
self-esteem than controls on this implicit measure.We also admin-
istered measures of impulsivity, executive function, and affect
to further explore the relationship between self-esteem and the
symptoms of these psychiatric disorders.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
A total of 71 adults participated in the study. The BPD and DPD
participants were outpatients, diagnosed by an independent psy-
chiatrist using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis
I Disorders (First et al., 2002), the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV Axis II Disorders (First et al., 1997), the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders (Steinberg,
1994), and the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 1999) Patients were included for the study if they met
DSM-IV-TR criteria for BPD (N = 18) or DPD (N = 18), and if
they had no history of schizophrenia, schizoaffective, bipolar, or
other organic mental disorders, no diagnosis of substance depen-
dence or abuse, and no unstable medical disorder. Presence of a
dissociative disorder was exclusionary for BPD participants, and
vice versa. Healthy controls (HC; N = 35) where recruited from
the community using ﬂyers and advertisements and were only
included if they met no Axis I or II DSM-IV-TR criteria and had
no neurological or unstable medical disorder. Participants where
matched for age, gender, and IQ (as measured by the WASI; see
Table 1). This studywas approvedby the institutional reviewboard
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Table 1 | Demographics.
Group N Gender, f:m Age, mean (SD, range) I.Q. (WASI total), mean (SD, range)
BPD 18 12:6 33.00 (9.505, 21–51) 106.4 (18.753, 73–142)
DPD 18 9:9 34.67 (10.387, 23–55) 117.19 (17.406, 97–165)
HC 35 16:19 34.66 (11.956, 20–63) 108.22 (15.231, 83–135)
f:m, Female: male ratio; SD, standard deviation.
at Mount Sinai School of Medicine and all subjects signed written
informed consent prior to participation.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES
Implicit association task
A measure of ISE designed to test the strength of implicit associa-
tions between categories by measuring the speed of their simulta-
neous evaluation. Participants sat in a quiet roomwithnowindows
in front of a computer screen and were instructed by a female test
administrator to sort the words presented in the center of the
screen into either “self” or “other,” or “pleasant” or “unpleasant”
categories as quickly as possible by pressing the corresponding key
on the left (“e”) or right (“i”) side of the keyboard. The category
words were shown in the upper right and upper left sides of the
screen and the target words were shown in the middle of the screen
(see Table 2 for stimulus words). The IAT involved ﬁve steps, as
described by Greenwald et al. (1998). In step one, a practice block
of 24 trials, participants sorted self or other words, such as “me”
and“their,”by pressing the“e”and“i”keys respectively. In step two
(24 practice trials), they sorted pleasant and unpleasant words, like
“joy” and “pain,” by pressing the “e” and “i” keys respectively. In
step three (60 trials), participants were presented with self, other,
pleasant, and unpleasant category words, categorizing both self
and pleasant with the same key (“e”), and other and unpleasant
with the other key (“i”). This was the congruent condition. In
step four (24 trials), the keys corresponding to self and to other
category words switched (now self was paired with the “i” key
and other with the “e” key). In step ﬁve, the incongruent condi-
tion, participants categorized self and unpleasant words with the
same key (“i”) and other and pleasant words with the other key
(“e”). The order of blocks was randomized for each participant.
Stimulus words remained on the screen until the correct response
was made, and the computer measured the reaction time between
presentation of the stimulus word and the participants’ correct
categorization of the word.
The IAT is based on the assumption that categorizing a bipolar
target concept (e.g., self or other) will be faster when it shares a
stronger association with a bipolar attribute concept (e.g., pleas-
ant or unpleasant) and when classifying these concepts requires
the same response. It is expected that participants with high self-
esteem will have faster response times when they must respond
with the same button for the target (“self”) and positive attribute
(“pleasant”) that are already implicitly associated, but that their
reaction time will be slower when responding requires cogni-
tive control to reverse this association, i.e., when “self” related
words are paired with“unpleasant”negative attributes (Greenwald
and Farnham, 2000). This assumption is supported by ﬁndings
Table 2 | IAT stimulus words.
Self Other Pleasant Unpleasant
Self Them Smile Tragedy
My It Sunshine Agony
Mine Their Rainbow Grief
Me They Paradise Death
I Other Warmth Sickness
Myself Themselves Joy Poison
Pleasure Pain
Happy Vomit
that healthy volunteers in fact demonstrate a self-positive bias
(Greenwald and Farnham, 2000; Buhrmester et al., 2011).
Frontal behavior questionnaire (Berlin and Rolls, 2004; Berlin et al.,
2005)
A self-report 20-item, 5-point Likert scale questionnaire that was
designed to measure types of behavioral problems such as disin-
hibition, social inappropriateness, perseveration, and cooperative-
ness, generally believed to result from orbitofrontal damage (Levin
et al., 1991).
Subjective Emotion Questionnaire (Berlin and Rolls, 2004; Berlin
et al., 2005)
Measures how often participants experience sadness, anger, fear,
happiness, and disgust in their current daily life on a 4-point Likert
scale.
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (Patton and Stanford, 1995)
This 30-item, 4-point Likert scale self-report measure assesses
long-term patterns of impulsive behavior. It asks subjects about
the way they act and think without relation to any speciﬁc period
of time, and it is used as a trait measure of impulsivity. The Bar-
ratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS-11) consists of three subscales:
attentional/cognitive (i.e., rapid shifts and impatience with com-
plexity), motor (i.e., acting without thinking), and non-planning
(i.e., lack of future orientation).
Temperament and Character Inventory (Cloninger et al., 1994),
version 9
This 240 item, true–false personality inventory includes the fol-
lowing temperament dimensions: novelty seeking (NS), a ten-
dency toward exploratory activity, intense excitement in response
to novelty, impulsive decision-making, and active avoidance of
monotony or frustration; harm avoidance (HA), inhibition and
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social withdrawal, shyness, and slow adaptation to change; reward
dependency (RD), a tendency to respond intensely to reward
signals, particularly those of social approval; and Persistence
(P), resistance to extinction despite intermittent reinforcement.
The questionnaire also measures three character dimensions:
self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on each
variable to determine whether mean scores differed signiﬁcantly
by group. While this resulted in a large number of independent
ANOVAs, our sample size did not permit the use of a multivari-
ate approach given the number of outcome measures of interest
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Least Signiﬁcant Difference (LSD)
post hoc analyses were performed in order to identify the speciﬁc
source of the difference and a false discovery rate test was run to
correct for multiple comparisons. Effect size was calculated using
Cohen’s d. Although a multivariate regression was not appropriate
given our sample size, Pearson’s correlations were run within each
group with ISE scores and each of the other measures that revealed
signiﬁcant results from the ANOVA. In Figure 1, error bars repre-
sent the SE, and ∗p< 0.0.05, ∗∗p< 0.01, and ∗∗∗p< 0.001 with
respect to control participants. An alpha level of 0.05 was used for
all statistical procedures.
DATA TRANSFORMATION AND ANALYSIS OF IAT
Data from the two critical steps, (1) where participants categorized
self with pleasant and other with unpleasant (congruent condi-
tion), and (2) where participants categorized self with unpleasant
and other with pleasant (incongruent condition), were used for
the primary analysis. Consistent with the data transformation pre-
sented by Greenwald et al. (1998), response latencies greater than
FIGURE 1 | Graph of mean ISE scores (±SE) by group. DPD participants
had signiﬁcantly higher implicit self-esteem than both BPD and HC
participants. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 with respect to
healthy controls.
3,000ms were recoded to 3,000ms, and latencies less than 300ms
were recoded to 300ms in order to eliminate the effect of extreme
response latencies, where participants either hit the correct key
before perceiving the stimulus or had a lapse in attention that
caused these outliers. Additionally, participants who responded to
>10% of trials within the two critical blocks faster than 300ms
were to be removed, as recommended by Greenwald et al. (2003),
however, no participants met this criterion. When participants
made an error categorizing the stimulus word, reaction times were
measured until they responded correctly, and these trials were
included in the analysis (per Greenwald et al., 2003). The IAT
effect – the measure of ISE – was then calculated by subtracting
the mean latency of the self/pleasant reaction times (congruent
trials) from that of the self/unpleasant blocks (incongruent trials).
Thus a high score is indicative of high self-esteem.
RESULTS
A one-way ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant differences in age, gen-
der,or IQ (asmeasured by theWASI) between groups (see Table 1),
and showed that BPD and DPD participants differed signiﬁcantly
on ISE, frontal behaviors, impulsivity, and several temperament
characteristics (see Table 3).
IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TASK
Implicit self-esteemwas calculated by subtracting themean latency
of the self/pleasant reaction times (congruent trials) from that
of the self/unpleasant blocks (incongruent trials). A high score,
therefore, is indicative of high self-esteem. We found that ISE was
signiﬁcantly related to group [F(2, 68)= 4.02, p< 0.05], and LSD
post hoc analyses indicated that DPD participants had signiﬁcantly
higher ISE than HC participants (p< 0.01) and BPD participants
(p< 0.05). Self-esteem was not signiﬁcantly different between HC
and BPD participants. Mean ISE scores by group are shown in
Figure 1.
FRONTAL BEHAVIOR QUESTIONNAIRE
Frontal Behavior scores were signiﬁcantly different between
groups [F(2, 65)= 17.488,p< 0.001].Post hoc analyses found that
BPD participants had signiﬁcantly higher Frontal Behavior Ques-
tionnaire (FBQ) scores than both DPD participants (p< 0.01)
and HCs (p< 0.001). Individuals with DPD also had signiﬁcantly
higher FBQ scores than HCs (p< 0.01).
SUBJECTIVE EMOTION QUESTIONNAIRE
Analyses of variance found signiﬁcant group differences in scores
for total subjective emotion [F(2, 66)= 12.808, p< 0.001], sad-
ness [F(2, 66)= 29.130, p< 0.001], anger [F(2, 66)= 12.709,
p< 0.001], fear [F(2, 66)= 14.934,< 0.001], and happiness [F(2,
66)= 15.304, p< 0.001]. Disgust was the only emotion that did
not show signiﬁcant differences between groups. Post hoc analy-
ses revealed that BPD and DPD participants similarly reported
signiﬁcantly higher scores than HCs for total subjective emotion
(p< 0.001 and 0.01, respectively), sadness (p< 0.001 for both),
anger (both p< 0.001), and fear (both p< 0.001), and signiﬁ-
cantly lower than HCs on the happiness subscale (p< 0.001 for
both groups). BPD and DPD participants did not signiﬁcantly
differ from one another on any subscale of the Subjective Emotion
Questionnaire (SEQ).
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Table 3 | Means, SDs, and effect sizes for each self-report questionnaire, by group.
Mean score (SD) Effect size (d )
BPD DPD HC BPD vs HC DPD vs HC BPD vs DPD
Frontal Behavior Questionnaire 9.56 (1.15)** 8.03 (1.99)** 6.80 (1.41) −2.07 −0.80 0.92
Subjective Emotion Questionnaire (total) 7.12 (1.54)*** 6.44 (2.83)** 4.40 (1.59) −1.73 −1.00 0.30
Sadness 1.75 (0.58)*** 1.78 (0.81)*** 0.60 (0.55) −2.05 −1.80 0.00
Anger 1.44 (0.63)*** 1.28 (0.83)*** 0.60 (0.50) −1.55 −1.10 0.22
Fear 1.50 (0.82)*** 1.39 (0.98)*** 0.49 (0.51) −1.63 −1.30 0.12
Happiness 1.44 (0.63)*** 1.28 (0.67)*** 2.20 (0.63) 1.20 1.43 0.25
Disgust 1.00 (0.82) 0.72 (0.83) 0.51 (0.61) −0.72 −0.30 0.34
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (total) 73.33 (11.20)*** 65.25 (10.78)*** 49.81 (9.14) −2.38 −1.60 0.74
Non-planning impulsivity 28.05 (5.38)*** 24.89 (3.96)*** 19.95 (4.57) −1.66 −1.10 0.67
Motor impulsivity 25.19 (4.34)*** 21.83 (5.04)** 18.54 (3.29) −1.80 −0.80 0.71
Attentional impulsivity 20.11 (4.28)*** 19.44 (4.06)*** 11.64 (2.73) −2.52 −2.40 0.16
TEMPERAMENTAND CHARACTER INVENTORY
Novelty seeking 21.33 (7.06) 18.44 (6.51) 17.03 (3.99) −0.80 −0.30 0.43
Harm avoidance 17.87 (7.62)*** 22.94 (5.84)*** 10.73 (4.56) −1.20 −2.40 −0.80
Reward dependence 15.47 (3.46) 16.81 (4.36) 15.93 (4.31) 0.11 −0.20 −0.30
Persistence 4.40 (1.96) 5.19 (2.11) 5.37 (1.94) 0.50 0.09 −0.40
Self-directedness 20.47 (5.41)*** 26.88 (7.17)*** 38.37 (3.92) 4.01 2.18 −1.00
Cooperativeness 28.60 (7.07)*** 32.69 (7.04) 35.93 (4.59) 1.33 0.58 −0.60
Self-transcendence 17.00 (8.60)** 13.56 (8.17) 10.67 (5.59) −0.90 −0.40 0.41
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 with respect to healthy controls. Items in bold indicate variables where BPD patients were also signiﬁcantly different than
DPD patients. Effect size was measured with Cohen’s d.
BARRATT IMPULSIVITY SCALE
Total impulsivity scores [F(2, 66)= 34.698, p< 0.001], as
well as attentional [F(2, 66)= 43.493, p< 0.001], motor [F(2,
66)= 15.805, p< 0.001], and non-planning impulsivity subscores
[F(2, 66)= 19.037, p< 0.001] were signiﬁcantly related to group.
Post hoc analyses reveal that BPD participants had signiﬁcantly
higher total impulsivity scores compared to HCs (p< 0.001) and
DPD participants (p = 0.05). DPD total BIS scores, though lower
than for BPD subjects, were also higher as compared to HC
(p< 0.001). BPD and DPD participants both had similarly higher
attentional BIS scores than control participants (p< 0.001 for
both comparisons), with no signiﬁcant difference between the
two clinical groups. BPD and DPD participants scored signiﬁ-
cantly higher on the motor and non-planning subscales than con-
trols (motor: p< 0.001 and p = 0.01, respectively, non-planning:
p< 0.001 for both comparisons), and BPD participants were sig-
niﬁcantly greater than those with DPD (p = 0.05 for motor and
non-planning).
TEMPERAMENT AND CHARACTER INVENTORY
Harm avoidance [F(2, 58)= 24.878, p< 0.001], self-directedness
[F(2, 58)= 63.019, p< 0.001], cooperativeness [F(2, 58)= 7.708,
p< 0.05], and self-transcendence [F(2, 58)= 4.022, p< 0.05] var-
ied signiﬁcantly by group,whileNS, social reward dependence, and
persistence did not.
LSD post hoc analyses show that BPD and DPD participants
scored signiﬁcantly higher on HA than HCs (p< 0.001 for both
comparisons), and DPD participants scored signiﬁcantly higher
than BPD participants (p = 0.05). Furthermore, both clinical
groups had lower self-directedness scores than controls (p< 0.001
for each) with BPD participants scoring signiﬁcantly lower than
DPD participants (p< 0.01). BPD participants also scored sig-
niﬁcantly lower on cooperativeness than controls (p< 0.001),
and higher on self-transcendence than HCs (p< 0.01). There
were no signiﬁcant differences between DPD and HC partici-
pants, nor DPD participants and BPD on cooperativeness and
self-transcendence subscales.
CORRELATIONS
The only signiﬁcant correlation with ISE was between ISE and
cooperativeness in HCs (r = 0.372).
DISCUSSION
Our results show that patients with BPD and DPD differ signif-
icantly in ISE, suggesting that disturbed self-construct in these
two disorders inﬂuences unconscious self-worth differently. Inter-
estingly, DPD participants had signiﬁcantly higher ISE than BPD
participants and controls. This was somewhat surprising, given
that participants with DPD have reported negative perceptions
of themselves (Michal et al., 2006). However, that study used
an explicit, self-report narcissism inventory without any direct
measures of self-esteem, and indices of related psychological out-
comes have been shown to weakly correlate with implicit methods
(Buhrmester et al., 2011). Taken together with evidence of the
corticolimbic disconnection model (Sierra and Berrios, 1998),
our ﬁndings may reﬂect a protective mechanism of dissocia-
tion in DPD that dampens automatic negative associations with
the self.
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If depersonalization indeed results from an adaptive, opposing
reaction mechanism of prefrontal activity and inhibited limbic
emotional processing, DPD participants may have higher ISE
scores because intact attentional systems allow them to be alert
and to respond quickly in general, while at the same time the
emotional salience of negative associations with the self is damp-
ened. Neuroimaging studies suggest that individuals with DPD
may lack the normal neural distinction between emotional and
neutral stimuli (Phillips et al., 2001; Medford et al., 2006), thus
emotion-processing areas may be less active and less able to facili-
tate self-negative associations quickly. Furthermore,DPDpatients’
performance on neuropsychological tasks also supports this dis-
connection hypothesis and inﬂated ISE. While DPD patients per-
form poorly on attention, short-term memory, and spatial reason-
ing tasks (Guralnik et al., 2000), they perform better than controls
on set shifting and divided attention tasks sensitive to DLPFC
function (DePrince and Freyd, 1999). Thus, DLPFC hyperactiva-
tion – increasing attention and inhibiting limbic structures – could
mediateDPDpatients’ability to dissociate and explain their higher
ISE.
Depersonalization disorder participants’ higher ISE could also
reﬂect an opposite, compensatory process of denial, whereby they
manifest a strong unconscious bias toward aligning themselves
with good attributes, in addition to dissociating negative attrib-
utes. The IAT is limited in that the components of the congruence
effect cannot be separated and analyzed. It seems likely, however,
that people with DPD are primarily slower to associate negative
words with themselves relative to positive words given their char-
acteristic down-regulation of implicit emotional reactivity (Sierra
and Berrios, 1998; Phillips et al., 2001). Furthermore, Michal et al.
(2006) found that DPD participants do not display narcissistic
characteristics, which could otherwise confound ISE. Thus their
higher self-esteem likely does not reﬂect defensive inﬂation of
self-worth.
Despite blunted emotional responsivity being a key feature of
DPD (Simeon et al., 2008), our ﬁndings on the SEQ show that
inner experience of emotion is not down-regulated. Previous stud-
ies have shown that individuals with DPD have reduced affective,
autonomic, and neural responses to externally presented stim-
uli such as emotional faces or scenes (Phillips et al., 2001; Sierra
et al., 2002, 2006; Simeon et al., 2008). Yet DPD patients experi-
ence signiﬁcant distress over their feelings numbness and unreality
(Oyebode, 2008). They may have lowered physiological respond-
ing to external emotional stimuli, but our results demonstrate that
they still experience negative emotions and can subjectively report
them.
In contrast to individuals with DPD, those with BPD did not
differ signiﬁcantly from HC on ISE. This may be explained by BPD
patients’ characteristic oscillations of emotion, identity, and self-
and other-evaluations (Tolpin et al., 2004; Lynum et al., 2008).
Additionally, the IAT itself shows moderate test–retest reliability,
with an average r = 0.56 across nine studies (Nosek et al., 2007).
Our participants completed the IAT only once, therefore if ISE
ﬂuctuates in BPD as explicit self-esteem does, this may not be
captured by the IAT due to its limited sensitivity to measure such
changes. To bettermeasure self-esteem lability in people with BPD,
future studies should administer the IAT at multiple time points.
AlthoughBPDparticipants didnot differ fromHCson ISE, they
were distinguished by having more frontal behaviors (indicative of
OFC dysfunction), greater impulsivity, and less self-directedness
than both DPD participants and HCs. Impulsivity has long been
identiﬁed as a characteristic symptom of BPD (Berlin and Rolls,
2004; Berlin et al., 2005). Low self-esteem may be a contributing
factor to impulsivity in some disorders (e.g., pathological gam-
bling, Burton et al., 2000), however, our ﬁndings do not support
this association in people with BPD or DPD.
Despite common hypoemotionality in DPD and emotional
lability in BPD, results for subjective emotions did not distinguish
DPD from BPD. Both groups had similarly elevated levels of sad-
ness, anger, and fear, and reported less happiness than controls.
Temperament scales, however, did illustrate differences between
the two disorders. DPD participants reported greater HA, which
may reﬂect heightened alertness from increased DLPFC activity
or which may be a learned response to trauma that commonly
precipitates depersonalization. In contrast, BPD participants had
signiﬁcantly lower scores on self-directedness, consistentwith their
reliance on perceptions of others’ feelings or opinions in deter-
mining their own personal image and goals. BPD participants
also had lower cooperativeness, which is consistent with their
characteristically dysfunctional interpersonal relationships.
We expected self-esteem to be signiﬁcantly related to person-
ality and temperament traits, yet cooperativeness was the only
personality trait that signiﬁcantly correlated with ISE scores. Simi-
lar to results on the SEQ,this couldbedue to thedifferencebetween
implicit and explicit measures. The personality and temperament
traits in this study were measured by explicit self-report ques-
tionnaires that may not correlate with ISE. Future studies should
administer implicit measures of emotion and temperament along
with the IAT for self-esteem to explore the relationship between
ISE, emotion, and personality further.
A limitation of the current study is that we did not include
an explicit measure of self-esteem for comparison. Discrepancies
between implicit and explicit self-esteemmay bemost indicative of
disordered self-perception (Schröder-Abé et al., 2007), thus future
studies should include an explicit measure in conjunction with the
IAT. Another limitation is that the study did not include severity
scores for BPD and DPD patients, thus we are unable to examine
whether our ISE ﬁndings are associated with degrees of illness.
Interpretation of the results is also limited in that ISE is calcu-
lated in terms of appraisal of one dichotomous category relative
to another. Strong pleasant-self associations may in fact reﬂect
more negative associations of “other,” as opposed to indicating
high self-esteem (Karpinski, 2004). ISE can also be affected by
preceding contexts that inﬂuence whether one adopts a normative
perspective (i.e., categorizing target concepts based on what oth-
ers ﬁnd pleasant/unpleasant) or a personal perspective (i.e., what
they themselves ﬁnd pleasant/unpleasant) for completing the task
(Han et al., 2010). Finally, we recognize that due to the relative
small sample sizes in the current study, it is difﬁcult to generalize
our ﬁndings. Therefore we intend to conduct a follow-up study
with a larger study size and to include severity measures to inves-
tigate the potential mediating effect of ISE on the intensity of
depersonalization and related psychopathology, which may allow
for a better interpretation of our current ﬁndings.
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CONCLUSION
While people with BPD and DPD overlap in terms of emotional
irregularities and dissociative symptoms (at least in a subgroup of
BPD patients), our ﬁndings suggest that differences in self-esteem,
behavior, and temperament can help identify where they diverge
in terms of cognition, behavior, and ultimately underlying neuro-
biology. Future research should examine BPD patients’ ISE scores
at multiple time points, along with explicit measures, to deter-
mine if ISE ﬂuctuates like self-report measures suggest. The IAT
should also be administered to patients with other dissociative
disorders, such as dissociative identity disorder and dissociative
amnesia, to further explore the relationship between a disordered
sense of self and self-esteem. Finally, neuroimaging can be used to
examine the neural basis of ISE and self-identity in these popu-
lations. Based on previous research (e.g., Berlin et al., 2005) and
the ﬁndings of the current study, we suggest that OFC dysfunc-
tion may contribute to the impulsivity and emotional lability of
BPD patients, while increased DLPFC activation might underlie
the down-regulation of emotion and high self-esteem observed in
patients with DPD.
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